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Wage Posting and Business Cycles
By GIUSEPPE MOSCARINI AND FABIEN POSTEL-VINAY∗
The canonical framework of Burdett and
Mortensen (1998) derives wage dispersion as
the unique equilibrium outcome in a station-
ary environment with meeting frictions and ran-
dom search. Firms derive monopsony power
from search frictions and commit to wage offers.
Workers earn rents: wages are not compressed to
the opportunity cost of work, owing to the abil-
ity of employed workers to receive additional of-
fers and quit directly from one job into another,
without experiencing unemployment.
In previous work (Moscarini and Postel-Vinay
2016), we explored the implications of this job
ladder for the aggregate dynamics of unem-
ployment, wages, and the firm size distribution
at business cycle frequencies. The model es-
tablishes a natural connection between the av-
erage wage growth in the economy and the
pace of Employer-to-Employer (EE) transitions,
through two channels. First, a composition ef-
fect: workers typically quit a job when they re-
ceive a better offer, hence the faster these tran-
sitions the higher the pace of reallocation to-
wards high wages, and the higher average wage
growth. Second, a strategic effect: the more op-
portunities workers have to quit, the more ag-
gressive are their employers with their wage re-
sponses, to try and retain them. The first ef-
fect benefits only job movers, the second both
movers and stayers. Therefore, we expect wage
growth to be positively related to the pace of EE
reallocation for all workers, but especially for
stayers. We verify this empirically with longi-
tudinal micro data from the Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP).
More generally, this successful labor mar-
ket paradigm severs any direct link between
unemployment and wages, and relates wage
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growth directly to EE reallocation. Any corre-
lation between real (and, with some price sticki-
ness, nominal) wage growth and unemployment,
the core of the Phillips curve, is purely spu-
rious. Unemployment is low when the job-
finding rate from unemployment is high. In
this wage-posting model with random search,
employed workers also benefit from more job
opportunities, leading to wage growth through
the mechanism described above. We argue that
monetary authorities concerned with inflation-
ary wage pressure should pay more attention
directly to the EE rate and less to the unem-
ployment rate. The post-Great Recession expe-
rience, characterized by full unemployment re-
covery but anemic recovery in both wages and
the EE rate, is an important case in point.
I. An equilibrium wage-posting model
A. The environment
We work with the heterogeneous firm version
of Burdett and Mortensen (1998)’s wage post-
ing model. Time is continuous, and the econ-
omy is in steady state. The labor market is pop-
ulated by a unit mass of workers, who can be
either employed or unemployed, and by a unit
measure of firms. Workers are risk neutral, in-
finitely lived, and maximize payoffs discounted
at rate ρ. Firms operate constant-return tech-
nologies with labor as the only input and with
productivity scale ωp, where ω is an aggregate
component, common to all firms, and p is a firm-
specific component, distributed across firms ac-
cording to a c.d.f. Γ over some positive interval[
p, p
]
, with density γ = Γ′. Both ω and p are
assumed constant over time.1
A firm can be inactive when its productivity
1In Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2016) we analyze the
stochastic dynamics of this model, where the impulse is given
by random shocks to ω. While equilibrium can be characterized
in that case, the dynamic model is intractable and must be solved
numerically. Here, we focus on tractable comparative statics to
gain intuition about the complex effects of aggregate productiv-
ity shocks on labor market equilibrium.
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is too low to profitably operate (see below), so
the unit measure of firms includes all potential
producers, active and inactive. We denote the
lower support of active firm types by pm≥ p (de-
termined momentarily). The measure of active
firms is therefore Γ(pm) = 1−Γ(pm).2
The labor market is affected by search fric-
tions in that unemployed workers can only sam-
ple job offers at Poisson rate λ0. While search-
ing, they enjoy a value of leisure b. Employed
workers earn a wage, lose their job at rate δ, and
also sample job offers at rate λ1. For simplicity,
we keep all three rates λ0, λ1 and δ exogenous
in this paper, and will analyze the economy’s re-
sponse to changes in those rates.3 We denote
by L(p) the equilibrium size of a firm of type p,
and N(p) =
∫ p
pm L(x)dΓ(x) the cumulated mea-
sure of employment at firms of productivity at
most p. Thus, N (p) is total employment and
u= 1−N (p) the unemployment rate.
B. Workers and Firm Behavior
A firm of type p commits to a constant wage
w(p) for the duration of any match, and is sub-
jected to an equal treatment constraint, whereby
it must pay the same wage to all of its workers.
Letting F(w) =
∫ p
pm I {w(p)≤ w}dΓ(p)/Γ(pm),
where I(·) is the indicator function, denote the
c.d.f. of wages posted by all firms (i.e. F(·) is
the distribution from which job searchers draw
wages), the value V (w) of working at a firm of-
fering wage w solves:
ρV (w) = w+δ [U−V (w)]
+λ1
∫ +∞
w
[V (x)−V (w)]dF(x)
where U denotes the value of unemployed
search. The worker collects a wage w and, loses
her job with flow probability δ (which yields a
capital loss of V (w)−U), or draws an alternate
job offer with chance λ1 that she accepts if its
wage (drawn from F(·)) exceeds that in her cur-
rent job, w.4 Following a similar logic, the value
2Throughout this paper, a bar over a cdf is used to denote
survival functions.
3In Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2016) we endogenize hir-
ing behavior and have job-contact probabilities determined by a
matching function.
4What workers care about are job values, rather than wages.
Showing that workers optimally accept jobs offering a higher
of unemployed search solves:
ρU = b+λ0
∫ +∞
R
[V (x)−U ]dF(x)
where R is the unemployed workers’ reservation
wage, defined byU =V (R). Because no worker
will accept a lower wage than R, the lower sup-
port of the wage distribution equals the greater
of R and any institutional minimum wage wmin.
A firm posting any wage w≥ R loses workers
to unemployment at rate δ, and to other more
valuable firms at rate λ1F(w). Simultaneously,
the firm hires a number of new workers equal to:
h(w)=
λ0u
Γ(pm)
+
λ1
Γ(pm)
∫ p
pm
I {w(p)≤ w}dN (p)
where λ0/Γ(pm) is an unemployed worker’s
flow probability of receiving a job offer from
that particular firm, λ1/Γ(pm) is the same for an
employed worker, and
∫ p
pm I {w(p)≤ w}dN (p)
is the measure of employed job seekers that
would earn less than w by staying where they
are. Balancing the flows in and out of that firm’s
workforce yields the steady-state size of a firm
posting wage w, L(w) = h(w)/
[
δ+λ1F(w)
]
.
Firms maximize steady-state flow profits:5
(1) pi(p) = max
w≥max〈R,wmin〉
(ωp−w)L(w).
This program gives rise to an optimal policy
w(p) and implied firm size L(p) = L (w(p)).
Standard monotone comparative statics argu-
ments establish that w(p) is increasing in p:
more productive firms offer higher wages. As a
consequence, the equilibrium offer distribution
is such that F (w(p)) = Γ(p)/Γ(pm). This can
be shown to imply a wage policy defined by
(2) w(p) =−pi(pm)
L(p)
+ω
p−∫ p
pm
(
Γ(pm)+ λ1δ Γ(p)
Γ(pm)+ λ1δ Γ(x)
)2
dx

wage than what they currently earn requires the small step that
consists of checking that V (w) is increasing in w.
5Maximization of steady-state profit flows coincides with
full dynamic maximization of the PDV of future profits when
firms are infinitely patient. If not, the two problems yield solu-
tions that produce the same steady-state allocation.
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where pi(pm) = L(pm)(ωpm−w(pm)) is the
profit earned by the least productive active firm.
This marginal firm’s type is either p (the least
productive type in existence), or the type that
achieves zero profit given the lower support of
the wage distribution, i.e. R/ω or wmin/ω,
whichever is larger. The marginal firm’s profit
pi(pm) is therefore zero unless neither the reser-
vation wage R nor the statutory minimum wage
bind, in which case the least productive firm is
active: pm = p. Intuitively, the firm’s mark-up
comprises two terms: the integral in (2) captures
market power due to frictions, while the other
term compensates the firm for the minimum rent
it can earn in the market, pi(pm)≥ 0.
In what follows, we focus on cases with an
active entry margin, i.e. where pi(pm) = 0 and
pm = max〈R/ω,wmin/ω〉. The wage function is
then given by (2) with pi(pm) = 0 and R defined
by V (R) =U . The latter implies:
(3) R= b+(λ0−λ1)
∫ +∞
R
F(x)
ρ+δ+λ1F(x)
dx.
C. Comparative statics
We now investigate the comparative response
of wages to changes in aggregate productivity ω.
Wages depend on ω directly, and also through
the measure of active firms, Γ(pm). Moreover,
even though contact rates are exogenous in this
model, we further consider the possibility that ω
directly impacts firms’ labor demand, therefore
affecting the job contact rates λ0 and λ1. We can
then decompose the response as follows:
(4)
dw(p)
dω
=
∂w(p)
∂ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
Opportunity
Cost
+
∂w(p)
∂pm
dpm
dω︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entry/Exit
+
∂w(p)
∂λ0
dλ0
dω
+
∂w(p)
∂λ1
dλ1
dω︸ ︷︷ ︸
Competition
We study the three pieces of dw(p)/dω in turn.
The first Opportunity Cost effect is the direct
impact of the productivity scale ω, which re-
flects the higher opportunity cost (due to a loss
of output) of not hiring/retaining workers that a
firm pays when ω increases. Suppose all firms
keep their wage offers fixed as ω rises to ω′ >ω.
Then firm p will go from productivity ωp to
ω′p. Given the arrival rates and strategy of other
firms, this firm will optimize by mimicking firm
p′= pω′/ω: whether the firm is more productive
for idiosyncratic or aggregate reasons is immate-
rial to its choice, given a wage offer distribution
and arrival rates. So firm p will raise its wage
offer to w(p′) > w(p), and, in equilibrium, all
firms will raise their wages.
Inspection of (2) when pi(pm) = 0 reveals that
the elasticity of the wage function with respect
to aggregate productivity ω is one in this model,
so that, if this direct effect were the only one at
play, all wages would rise proportionally to ω.6
The second Entry and Exit effect is the im-
pact of aggregate productivity on the set of ac-
tive firms. The model allows for entry and exit
“at the bottom”: as ω changes, so will the en-
try threshold pm. In general, an increase in ω
pulls some relatively unproductive firms into the
market, thus lowering wages: dpm/dω < 0 and
∂w(p)/∂pm > 0.
The (positive) response of wages to pm is
exactly one-for-one at the bottom and changes
along the productivity scale in a complex way
that depends on Γ(·). The negative response
of pm to ω depends on whether the reservation
wage R or the minimum wage is binding. In the
latter case, pm = wmin/ω so that dpm/dω is sim-
ply equal to −pm/ω (negative unit elasticity).
Things are more complex when R is binding, as
then pm = R/ω is defined implicitly by (3) and
dpm/dω depends, inter alia, on the responses to
ω of the job contact rates λ0 and λ1.
The third Competition effect is the direct im-
pact of aggregate productivity on wage compe-
tition through the response of the arrival rates of
offers λ0 and λ1, given the set of active firms.
Here we can make the following key remark:
given the reservation wage R (or given a bind-
ing minimum wage), the wage function (2) only
depends on λ1, and not on λ0, i.e.:
∂w(p)
∂λ0
= 0 and
∂w(p)
∂λ1
≥ 0.
This implies that a change in the arrival rate λ0
of offers to the unemployed has no direct ef-
fect on equilibrium wages, and will work only
through the reservation wage R, whenever it is
6In Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2016) we show that, with
endogenous hiring, this direct effect is dampened by hiring costs,
so that the w(p) with respect to ω can be less than one.
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binding. What matters for wage competition
above R is the arrival rate of offers to employed
workers λ1, which is the true index of compe-
tition. If R is fixed, or if a binding minimum
wage makes it irrelevant, firm commitment in-
sulates wages from cyclical fluctuations in the
value of unemployed search, as in Hall and Mil-
grom (2008)’s credible bargaining, but for very
different reasons.
II. Empirical Evidence
In Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2016) we an-
alyze the quantitative bite of each of the ef-
fects highlighted above using a fully stochastic
dynamic version of the steady-state model pre-
sented here, including endogenous and costly
hiring by firms. Here, we focus on one important
prediction of the model, namely that when the
minimum wage binds, the unemployment exit
rate does not have any impact on wages, only
the job-finding rate from employment does.
Suggestive evidence is provided by Faberman
and Justiniano (2015), who notice that the aggre-
gate Employment Cost Index (ECI) is strongly
correlated over the business cycle with the ag-
gregate job-switching rate (the fraction of em-
ployed workers who change employers without
going through unemployment — a proxy for λ1
in our model). In this paper, we investigate the
data further on this question.
Table 1 shows results from regressions of
the quarterly growth rate of the ECI on the
(quarterly averages of the) job finding rate of
the unemployed (UE rate, the empirical coun-
terpart of the model’s λ0) and employment-to-
employment job switching rate (EE rate). The
latter two variables were constructed by Fallick
and Fleischman (2004) from the Current Popu-
lation Survey (CPS), and are now available from
1994 onwards.7 We first comment on the first
two columns of Table 1, where we use the cur-
rent release of the ECI as the dependent vari-
able.8 In the first column we regress the ECI
7We include the quarterly change in the unemployment rate
as an additional control (omitted in the tables) to capture the Op-
portunity Cost and Entry/Exit effects of ω — see equation (4).
All of our results are robust to omitting the change in unemploy-
ment which, interestingly, is not estimated to have a statistically
significant effect on wage growth in any of the regressions.
8The current release of the ECI (Bureau of Labor Statistics
2001-2015) covers 2001Q1-2015Q3. Historical series starting in
1980 are also available: we use those in columns 3 and 4 of Table
growth rate on the UE rate alone, and obtain,
as expected, a positive and significant correla-
tion. Yet in the second column, we include the
EE rate as an additional regressor, and see that,
not only is the coefficient on the EE rate positive
and significant (as most theories would predict),
but also that the effect of the UE rate all but dis-
appears and loses its statistical significance.
We repeat the exercise in columns 3 and 4
of Table 1, using the longer historical ECI se-
ries which extends our data set to 1994-present.
Although the results are less clear-cut over this
longer horizon, we still find that the impact of
the UE rate is halved when the EE rate is in-
cluded into the regression, while the latter has a
sizable and significant impact on wage growth.
We conservatively conclude that the aggregate
data provide some support to (at least do not dis-
prove) the model’s prediction that only λ1 puts
substantial pressure on wage growth. Yet it is
questionable whether the relatively short time
series that are available are enough to disentan-
gle the effects of the UE and EE rates on wage
growth. We thus complement our aggregate ev-
idence with a brief analysis of micro data. One
extra advantage of individual-level data is that
they allow us to separately estimate the effects
of UE and EE rates on the wage growth of job
movers and job stayers. The model predicts that
neither should be influenced by the UE rate, and
both should be influenced positively (although
with different magnitudes) by the EE rate.
We extract a panel of workers aged 20-60
from the last four panels (covering 1996-2015)
of the SIPP. One advantage of the SIPP is that
it allows us to measure job spells fairly pre-
cisely: in particular, we can identify job-to-job
switchers and job stayers. A significant draw-
back of the SIPP is that the wage data are very
noisy, particularly in earlier panels. Bearing that
in mind, we regress individual monthly wage
growth on backward-looking six-month moving
averages of the aggregate UE and EE rates from
Fallick and Fleischman (2004), either on their
own or interacted with job stayer/switcher indi-
cators, plus a set of controls.9
1. We thank Ryan Michaels for mentioning those series to us.
9We define a job stayer as someone staying with the same
employer in two consecutive months. We attempt to capture
“voluntary” job switchers by defining those as people chang-
ing employers with less than 29 days’ unemployment in between
jobs, excluding transitions by dual job holders caused by the loss
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TABLE 1—THE CYCLICALITY OF EMPLOYMENT COST INDEX GROWTH
Dependent variable: ECI growth
current (2001Q1-2015Q3) historical (1994Q4-2015Q3)
UE rate 0.203∗∗∗ −0.042 0.176∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗
EE rate — 0.293∗∗∗ — 0.084∗∗
Note: Quarterly data, MA-smoothed. All rates are normalized for comparability.
Source: CPS compiled by Fallick and Fleischman (2004), BLS, and authors’ calculations.
TABLE 2—THE CYCLICALITY OF WAGE GROWTH.
Dependent variable: monthly log wage growth
UE rate 0.266∗∗∗ −0.165 — —
EE rate — 0.515∗∗∗ — —
(UE rate)*switcher — — 0.583∗∗∗ −0.355
(UE rate)*stayer — — 0.345∗∗∗ −0.119
(EE rate)*switcher — — — 1.032∗
(EE rate)*stayer — — — 0.591∗∗∗
Note: Monthly data, 1996m1-2013m7 (with gaps). All rates are normalized for comparability. Controls include gender, race, age,
marital status, education, industry, occupation, mover/stayer status, and establishment size. Standard errors are clustered by individual.
Source: CPS compiled by Fallick and Fleischman (2004), SIPP, and authors’ calculations.
Table 2 shows the results, which broadly con-
firm the aggregate results from Table 1. The first
two columns of Table 2 mirror the regressions
in Table 1 and show that the positive correla-
tion between the UE rate and wage growth dis-
appears when the EE rate is included as a regres-
sor. Breaking down the effects of the UE and
EE rates between job switchers and job stayers
(columns 3 and 4) yields similar results for both
worker categories, although less precisely esti-
mated for job switchers.
Taken together, those descriptive results sup-
port the model’s prediction that wages are pri-
marily responsive to the job contact rate of em-
ployed workers, rather than to the unemploy-
ment exit rate. Beyond the model, and as pointed
out before by Faberman and Justiniano (2015),
this evidence suggests that the EE job switching
rate is a strong predictor of future wage growth
and, ultimately, of inflation.
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